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FRAMING “BOMB TALK”: THE MACRO CONSEQUENCES OF THE
MICROFOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION
IN A GOFFMANIAN NUCLEAR WORLD1
Michael R. Hill
Department of Sociology
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Abstract
This paper, originating with issues generated in Professor Deegan’s seminar on
contemporary sociological theory at the University of Nebraska, explores the “frames” or
microfoundations of everyday interaction and their consequences for the ultimate macrosociological
threat: global nuclear annihilation. The theoretical basis of this study is Erving Goffman’s Frame
Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. The adequacy and comprehensiveness of
Goffman’s major constructs are substantiated by data from the everyday world of newspapers and
popular culture. “Keys” (or transformational conventions) are pivotal in this analysis. The central
thesis of this paper holds that the keys used to transformationally restructure and “make sense of”
frames in everyday, interpersonal interactions allow us to routinely ignore the high probability of
macrosociological annihilation by keying it into less lethal frames, thereby dangerously increasing
the probability of global nuclear holocaust. The paper concludes with the hypothesis that solving
the macrosociological threat of global genocide requires inventing a new framework of meaning for
the micro-level organization of everyday life.
PART I: INTRODUCTION
This paper concerns “bomb talk”: the many ways we talk about our lethal and
precisely-targeted global nuclear arsenal. It is a theoretical and applied exercise based on Erving
Goffman’s insightful study, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Most
“bomb talk” is socially irresponsible to the extent that it continuously allows us to “escape” the
serious and single-minded resolution of our macrosociological nuclear reality. The most dangerous
features of “bomb talk” lie embedded in the very rules we use to give meaning and structure to
interpersonal interaction.
By focusing on the rules for organizing and transforming meaning in everyday life, this paper
addresses our perplexing cultural preparedness for global annihilation. The thesis of this paper holds
that the way we “frame” or engage in microfoundational talk about our lethal macro reality defeats
our efforts to find a solution to the threat of global nuclear annihilation. This is the potential horror
of life/death in a Goffmanian nuclear world. I conclude that to find a solution to this
macrosociological nightmare we must radically overhaul, if not revolutionize, the microfoundational
framework of everyday language and interpersonal social interaction.
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As academics, we generate quite a bit of “bomb talk” ourselves, and this paper is no
exception. Let me emphasize that this paper in itself is not “part of any solution.” The only genuine
solution lies in coordinated, macro-social action. We need constantly to remind ourselves that
academic and professional “bomb talk” is no less problematic than the everyday, garden variety.
We go to great lengths as intellectuals to “make sense of” the nuclear threat. We teach about
it in courses, we write analytic monographs, we organize symposia. Using Goffman’s concept of
frame analysis, I demonstrate that our nuclear world can be (and has been) “made sense of” in so
many disparate ways (including courses, monographs, and symposia) that we are in danger of failing
to effectively confront the awesome, untransformed reality of nuclear destruction. I question here
whether all our “bomb talk” in all its formats is helping in any significant way to reduce the
probability of nuclear holocaust. Indeed, the plethora of formats may be a root microfoundational
factor in our inability to concentrate our attention on the nuclear threat and act effectively.
Curiously, sociologists as a group have been remarkably quiet on the problem of nuclear
annihilation. The most cogent analysis to-date is still C. Wright Mills’ (1960) The Causes of World
War Three. Mills calls on the world’s intellectuals to sensitize us to the macrosociological aspects
of nuclear threat. He urges recognition, study, and publication of the vested interests of politicians,
military men, and munitions merchants. I conclude here, however, that the world’s cultural laborers
have a much more difficult task ahead than generating more studies and symposia on another “public
issue” (Mills, 1959).
In any event, few sociologists have responded to Mills’ call for academic mobilization.
Ronald Kramer and Sam Marullo (1985) survey the recent sociological literature and find it largely
barren. They recount a content analysis by Finsterbush of the three mainline sociology journals:
American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, and Social Forces. Finsterbush
examined the 6500 articles published in the years 1945 to 1984, but, Kramer and Marullo (1985:
283) report, Finsterbush found only six that “deal with nuclear weapons related issues.” Unlike
many who are gravely disappointed by this low level of production, I do not call here for a crash
program of specifically sociological studies focused on nuclear devastation per se. Workers in
related social science disciplines, including history and political science, have written a great deal
about nuclear conflict and the history of the arms race — without discernable effect. I see no reason
to expect the standard sociological treatments to do any better. We do need to get to work, but our
labors must take us in directions that differ dramatically from traditionally-defined sociological
practice.
I argue here, paradoxically, that symposia, conferences, special panels, and papers (such as
the one now in hand) are symptomatic of a deep cultural sleep that fogs our thinking, our reflections,
and our debates where globally destructive nuclear devices are concerned. My thesis is simply this:
Our microfoundational cultural apparatus appears ill-equipped, if not unable, to conceptualize or
frame the present nuclear threat in a way that lets us truly come to grips with it. We keep “making
sense” of it in ways that let it slip away from us. My reasons for this dismal assessment rest on the
arguments found in Erving Goffman’s (1974) analytical study of everyday life: Frame Analysis: An
Essay on the Organization of Experience.
Goffman is well-known for his studies of the microfoundations of interpersonal interaction,
but these have only recently been interpreted as having wider sociological importance. Goffman’s
influential early work includes: Asylums; Behavior in Public Places; Encounters; Gender
Advertisements; Interaction Ritual; Presentation of Self in Everyday Life; Relations in Public;
Stigma; and Strategic Interaction. With the publication of Frame Analysis, however, Goffman’s
microfoundational analyses took a much more formal, systematic turn that informs our
understanding of macrosociological possibilities. Anthony Giddens now writes:
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Goffman’s writings thus contribute much more to an understanding of
‘macro-structural’ properties than Goffman supposed. (Giddens, 1987: 138).
In this paper, I concentrate on Goffman’s analysis of the ways in which interacting persons “make
sense” of their situation and activities by resorting to “frames.” It will become painfully clear that
these techniques of “making sense,” while extraordinarily useful to everyday interactants, allow us
to play disastrous “mind games” in the face of full force nuclear destruction. Drawing such
macrosociological consequences from microfoundational analyses has been resisted by symbolic
interactionists during the last two decades.
The apolitical tone of much microsociological analysis is, in its own way, a social
construction of reality — a construction whose full explication lies beyond the scope of this paper.
It is helpful however, to point out that micro analysis has always had a macro political component
— if one chooses to emphasize it. It is striking how few symbolic interactionists emphasize the fact
that George H. Mead (1934) wrote on mind, self, and society. Much of Mead’s work and writing
(and that of W.I. Thomas and Jane Addams, for that matter) focused on organized social action, and
he took part in many political activities in Chicago. For Mead, the development of “international
mindedness” was the mark of a fully mature “self” (Mead, 1934; Deegan, 1988).
So too with Jessie Taft (a Chicago student of G.H. Mead and W.I. Thomas). Taft concluded
her doctoral dissertation on the interpersonal meaning of the women’s movement with this
observation:
The fundamental purpose of the woman movement, therefore, as of any great
social movement, is bound to be the producing of social scientists who will be
capable of offering hypotheses that are based on the actual data constituting the
problems, and the bringing about of an increasing social consciousness among all
people such that they too will become sufficiently aware of the real content of social
relationships and be willing to undergo the adjustments of the social order necessary
to make actual the theories which promise salvation. (Taft, quoted in Deegan and
Hill, 1987: 46).
Taft states the platform for sociological action. Study of micro-level human experience and
situations, and the offering of hypotheses based on these studies, calls forth social consciousness —
and macro-level change.
The widespread view of micro analysis as apolitical derives in some part from the popular
and well-known work of Peter Berger, a student of phenomenologist Alfred Schutz. Berger’s work
on the social construction of reality (Berger and Kellner, 1964; Berger and Luckmann, 1966) gives
primary emphasis to the individual and his/her social development. Schutz’ (1944) “stranger” is not
a citizen, but a social outsider whose main concern is to learn the rules, typifications, and relevances
of a new society. Yet, buried within Schutz is a political presupposition of major importance.
Reflecting on the multiplicity and great variety of human systems of relevance and
typifications (i.e., multiple realities), Schutz found no problem in their proliferation or coexistence,
except when we are forced to accept the worldview of more powerful agents. Specifically, he said,
if a person:
. . . has the power to impose his system of relevance upon the individuals
typified by him, and especially to enforce its institutionalization, then this fact will
create various repercussions on the situation of the individuals typified against their
will. (Schutz, 1971: 255).
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Thus, Schutz was clearly aware of the potential for hegemonic domination and ideological
oppression (and he wrote a thoughtful analysis of the need for the United Nations as a forum for
international cooperation). In like vein, Goffman presupposes the possibility of ideological
hegemony, but he is interested in a quite different and more fundamental problem: explicating the
“frames” in which both oppressor and oppressed can become jointly ensnared. Goffman’s goal in
Frame Analysis is truly microfoundational, and the consequences of his findings — when applied
to the nuclear world of today — are genuinely macrosociological.
In the introduction to Frame Analysis, Goffman (1974: 14) wrote:
The analysis developed [here] does not catch at the differences between the
advantaged and disadvantaged classes and can be said to direct attention away from
such matters. I think that is true. I can only suggest that he who would combat false
consciousness and awaken people to their true interests has much to do, because the
sleep is very deep. And I do not intend here to provide a lullaby but merely to sneak
in and watch the way people snore.
These words alert us that Goffman does not intend a political analysis in the usual sense.
Nonetheless, his analysis is fundamentally political and filled with macrosociological consequences.
He warns us that we have ways — deeply ingrained cultural practices — for “fooling ourselves,”
for remaining asleep when we think we are wide awake, as, for example, when we cast an
“informed” vote, listen “attentively” to a “thoughtful” lecture, or “carefully analyze” an
“intellectual” debate while, in fact, remaining largely ignorant of the crucial points. These practices
are the very ones to which we, as cultural laborers, so often turn and so often offer to others as
“solutions.” I submit that the present reality of nuclear annihilation is normalized by our cultural
practices such that we cannot effectively comprehend that an unprecedented, unfathomable order
of lethal magnitude confronts our world and our minds. This is a deeply political assertion for
cultural laborers because it suggests that we — and the way we think as intellectuals — may be an
integral part, perhaps even a sustaining cause of “the nuclear problem.”
Given this assertion, it is crucial to ask why have I written this paper, to ask why I have the
audacity to make yet another addition to the great pile of intellectual commentary on life in the
nuclear age. I present two justifications. First, I do not think that our intellectual tools are useless,
only that they are inadequately developed as things now stand. Second, I do not think that we are
helpless. The present threat was/is constructed by human architects and thus humans can — I trust
— dismantle it virtually overnight if so inclined. The point I suspect to be true and that I emphasize
here is that our present, extensive battery of cultural practices and conceptual categories results —
for whatever reasons — in situations that disable us as cultural workers when we confront the
reality of nuclear annihilation. Thus, this paper is not a “call” for the end of the arms race, for such
calls have been made repeatedly without significant effect by persons in far more powerful and
influential positions than me. Our past efforts and standard cultural practices have everywhere failed
us and I suggest that we will not succeed by doing “more of the same.” This paper is a call, however,
to the intellectuals who read these comments to devise an effective way to fully and simultaneously
comprehend the finality and the solubility of our socially-constructed nuclear predicament.
It is, I think, difficult for those of us who have analyzed the proliferation of destructive
nuclear devices to stop and question reflexively whether we are really doing anything that will
effectively remove the reality of the planned nuclear holocaust. We believe deeply in the efficacy
of our studies and reports. We too have vested interests that Mills (1960) too easily forgets. It is
certainly true that research, lectures, and teach-ins, for example, often make us feel better, give us
a sense of action, and help keep alive our beliefs in democracy and free speech in significant and
important ways. I do not deny these admirable outcomes, but I do point out that these — and many

5
related intellectually-rooted activities (i.e., writing books, organizing symposia, drafting
manifestoes, etc.) — have not been effective in any demonstrable sense in reducing the escalating
probability of nuclear annihilation on a global scale. Because you are a member of a thoughtful
audience of readers, I hope you will reflect on the microfoundational issues raised in this paper. If
so, I enlist your effort in what appears to me, at least, to be the foremost cultural and intellectual
puzzle of our time. Specifically, we must invent a new and as yet unimagined way of speaking and
thinking about global annihilation that cannot be ignored, devalued, debated, coopted, subverted,
exaggerated, or denied. Here is a distinctly cultural task that demands our sweat, dedication,
cooperation, and urgent attention.
The nature of the task before us is immense. The tools with which we must work include our
systems of logic, our conceptual categories, our social practices. These tools are not only inadequate,
they are also part — if not parcel — of the problem we must solve. Our current techniques for
“making sense” of things allow us to transform the immediacy of nuclear annihilation and to talk
about it in many other terms, including: prayers, treaties, jokes, songs, portentous statements, and
so on. This tranformational ability is indeed useful in many social instances, but in the case of
destructive nuclear devices it permits us to easily — I think too easily — distance ourselves from
the lethal reality we inhabit daily, moment to moment. These transformations — and the factors that
make them possible — are the central issue in Goffman’s Frame Analysis. My purpose in the next
several pages is to illustrate clearly that our cultural practices permit us too easily to escape — or
at least distance ourselves — from the finality of our lethal reality. We need new frames in which
such irresponsible escape is not possible. Recognizing this social need, however, is predicated on
an understanding of our old frames and why they fail us. Goffman, when writing Frame Analysis,
frequently resorted to published anecdotes, newspaper stories, and artifacts from popular culture to
illustrate his major points. I have followed his methodological example in writing this paper. In
Goffman’s words, let us now sneak in and watch the way we snore.
PART II: THE PRIMARY FRAMEWORKS
Goffman systematically outlined the ways in which we “make sense of” events in our world.
Relevance to the issue at hand is direct: How do we go about “making sense of” our nuclear reality?
How do we “make sense of” the socio-physical fact that sufficient destructive force to destroy all
life ten times over (a conservative estimate) stands “ready to go at a moment’s notice”? The
Goffmanian answer is that we interpret everyday events in terms of two primary frameworks: (1)
natural laws, such as those found in physics, chemistry, and biology which “identify occurrences
seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, ‘purely physical’” and (2) guided doings
which “incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effect of a live agency,” usually understood as
human (Goffman, 1974: 22).
Thus, the falling of an apple to the ground is explained or “made sense of” by reference to
the local laws of gravity. On the other hand, a young person throwing an apple through Dr.
Newton’s window in the physics building illustrates a guided doing. This example, apples thrown
through windows, highlights a special feature about “guided doings.” They involve the simultaneous
coordination of human intent, bodily action, and the utilization of natural laws. Thus, spiking apples
through a window — to be a guided doing — requires intent to throw, plus the bodily coordination
to properly fire the missile such that it goes where intended. This last part requires at least an
experiential understanding of the physics of trajectory. In addition, “guided doings” are always
subject to failure, that is, there is always the real possibility that our young thrower will miss Dr.
Newton’s window altogether. Shortly, I will note the circumstances which account for guided doings
which go “haywire” when they shouldn’t — as well as those which succeed in the face of seemingly
impossible odds.
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First, however, let me be quite clear about the way Goffman’s basic scheme applies to
nuclear weapons. Consider a nuclear detonation in its purely physical aspects. This event can be
explained or “made sense of” by making reference to natural laws, specifically the laws of physics.
The origin of the energy released by nuclear devices is contained in Einstein’s famous and compact
equation:
E= mc
where m is mass and c is the speed of light (Craig and Jungerman, 1986: 112). More dramatic and
less terse was President Harry Truman’s characterization of atomic energy during his announcement
of the first military use of nuclear fission:
It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the Universe.
The force from which the sun draws its powers. . . . (New York Times, 8-7-45: 8).
Now, consider the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. This was,
in no uncertain terms, a complex and coordinated example of a “guided doing.” The following
statement, made by the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, on August 7, 1945, underscores this point:
The recent use of the atomic bomb on Japan, which was today made known
by the President, is the culmination of years of herculean effort on the part of science
and industry working in cooperation with the military authorities. (New York Times,
8-7-45: 8).
The available documentary record includes the specific order instructing the United States’
military to drop the bomb. The order said, in part:
1. The 309 Composit Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb
as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945. . . .
(Source: Documentary in Japanese (untranslated) on the Hiroshima bombing,
University of Michigan library).
Through reference to such documentary evidence, an unequivocal case is made that the nuclear
destruction of two Japanese cities by the United States was a guided doing.
The obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the delivery and detonation of nuclear
weapons is “made sense of” by reference to Goffman’s two primary frameworks: natural laws and
guided doings. In our culture, there is nothing mysterious here, nothing beyond our grasp of
understanding — and this I argue should be (but isn’t) seen as deeply problematic on a
microfoundational level. We may have great moral anguish and questions about the military use of
nuclear weapons, but these do not negate the fact that someone did order the pilot and crew of the
Enola Gay on a destructive mission of unprecedented dimensions. We may not approve of the action
taken, but we understand it as a guided doing. Was the bombing of Japan a “sin”? Was it the act of
an insane person to give such an order and for others to obey it? Perhaps — but insanity and sin can
be made sense of — can be understood in our culture — by reference to natural laws and guided
doings. The point is this: the comprehensive facticity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki do not escape our
basic, fundamental ways of explaining our world to ourselves. To summarize at this point, I have
identified Goffman’s two primary frameworks and have demonstrated that the U.S. initiation of
intentionally destructive nuclear detonations fits well within these frameworks. That is to say, we
have no other culturally-sustained accounting of these events, such as magic, the whims of angry
gods, or extra-terrestrial intervention, for example.
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PART III: BRIDGE EXPLANATIONS
Here, I will try to illuminate the built-in potential for both failure as well as exceptional
performance in guided doings. For example, first suppose the crew members of the Enola Gay had
got their bearings wrong, made a mistake, and detonated an atomic bomb over Honolulu instead of
Hiroshima. Alternatively, suppose the crew of the Enola Gay had faced turbulent weather and
Japanese anti-aircraft fire over Hiroshima so heavy as to virtually guarantee an aborted mission and
yet somehow managed to drop a bomb on the intended target. How could these hypothetical
possibilities, if realized, be explained? In the first case, Goffman refers to “muffings” and in the
second he refers to “stunts.” These (and two additional categories of explanation noted below) are
the major “bridge explanations” in Goffman’s scheme. By this term, I mean that these are formulas
we use to “make sense of” events that do not fall easily into the two primary frameworks. These
ways to account for things help to keep the epistemological foundations of our everyday world intact
— and, I submit, vulnerable to future nuclear devastation.
III. A. Muffings
A “muffing” occurs when the control normally expected in a guided doing is absent or is
temporarily lost. Hence, when persons normally able to walk up a flight of stairs without falling
down do in fact lose their footing and fall down, one can speak of a muffing. At the micro level,
muffings allow us to forgive interpersoanl faux pas, goofs, and slips. As linguistic ploys, they are
extraordinarily useful, allowing us time and again to recover our social footing.
On the other hand, one can easily understand that muffings where nuclear weapons are
concerned are potentially consequential in the extreme. The “relatively minor” nuclear
contamination catastrophes at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl give pause for reflection on the
socio-global significance of nuclear muffings. Indeed, President Truman, in his announcement on
August 6, 1945, emphasized the safety of the bomb manufacturing process. And well he should
have, because the question readily comes to mind: If a bomb can destroy cities in Japan, what
happens if one goes off “by accident” in the U.S.? Truman put it this way:
Although the workers at the sites [in the U.S.] have been making materials
to be used in producing the greatest destructive force in history they have not
themselves been in danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost
care has been taken for their safety. (New York Times, 8-7-45: 8)
Such is the stuff of Presidential assurances.
Accounts of nuclear events since 1945 have often made recourse to “muffings” as a category
of explanation. For example, the New York Times reported the following as part of a story about
muffings involving nuclear weapons:
The Pentagon yesterday released details on 32 nuclear accidents that killed
at least 56 persons in the last 30 years. . . . Nuclear weapons and material were lost
in several of the cases. (New York Times, 5-17-81: 17)
The point here is not so much that nuclear bomb accidents do happen, but that we have available
such linguistic categories as “accident,” “mistake,” “carelessness,” and “muffing” and that we do
apply them in situations where persons have failed to exhibit “appropriate control” during the
performance of “guided doings” involving nuclear weapons. We do not see the application of these
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categories as reprehensible or dangerous. Quite the opposite, we appear culturally programmed to
readily accept their use.
Commentators on our nuclear age have already worried that World War III could be started
“by accident.” Military officials rush to note, however, that the estimated statistical probability of
such an accident is extremely small. C. Wright Mills (1960) found such assurances less than
comforting, observing that given enough time an event with a low probability of occurrence
becomes a virtual certainty in the long run. Seen in this light — and considering the irreversible
character of mutually assured wholesale nuclear destruction — the category “muffing” is
unforgiving, not subject to remedy, lacking any opportunity of “doing better next time.”
III. B. Stunts
In contrast to muffings, doing a “stunt” displays remarkable control where none is expected.
Goffman (1974: 30) defines a stunt as:
The maintenace of guidance and control by some willed agency under what
are seen as nearly impossible conditions.
The A-bomb mission flown to Hiroshima was by no means a stunt. It was carefully planned
and rehearsed. The military mind does not like stunts and no doubt actively discourages them in
conjunction with nuclear weapons. Indeed, the government bureaucracy applies strict controls on
access to and possession of weapons-grade nuclear materials as well as to information on how to
construct and detonate nuclear devices. These tight security measures, however, create the “nearly
impossible conditions” that not only tempt the prankster, but also make successful espionage a
financially and politically lucrative activity.
It is worth considering that the “impossible odds” may be media constructions and official
propaganda rather than actual reality. The high odds against stealing nuclear secrets and materials
are a central feature in fictional accounts of the James Bond variety. The protagonists in such stories
require super-human resolve, technological sophistication and gadgetry, and uncommon athletic
prowess in to carry off the enemy’s nuclear secrets. Real life spies, however, are typically mundane
and — when aided by the “muffings” and oversights of others — find that the actual theft of nuclear
secrets is much easier than many of us would suspect.
A recently reported theft of both secrets and bomb-grade uranium was attributed to a man
involved in such an array of prior criminal acts that one suspects a serious muffing in his being
approved for a Top Secret security clearance. The Detroit News reports:
Washington — A nuclear facility technician with a top security clearance is
accused of selling classified documents and uranium to the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) as well as being involved in rape, arson, robbery, illegal drugs,
and impersonating a police officer, a government report said Thursday. . . . The GAO
report said the technician suspected of committing the series of crimes got an intial
security clearance in 1974 and answered security questionnaires in 1978 and 1984
but that no derogatory information was uncovered until a deputy sheriff told the
Energy Department about the employee’s arrest for carrying a weapon and having
an expired license plate. (Detroit News, 4-10-87: 7A).
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Such accounts give one pause to wonder why nuclear-based stunts are not, in fact, much more
common. Perhaps they are. The proverbial barn door appears left open on too many occasions. If
“high risk” espionage is executed by agents sufficiently astute to keep their car registrations current,
their exploits may well go undetected — and unappreciated by the general public.
In some ways more stunning than the exploits of nuclear spies is the documented work of
J.A. Phillips, an undergraduate physics student who “beat the odds” by successfully designing an
atomic bomb as a class project. His autobiographical account, titled: Mushroom: The Story of the
A-Bomb Kid (Phillips and Aristotle, 1978), is fascinating reading. Phillips’ design resulted by
combining his basic physics training with information in unclassified documents readily available
for purchase from the U.S. National Technical Information Service.
Rank amateurs can also “beat the odds.” Howard Morland (1979), a reporter for The
Progressive magazine, wrote an article detailing the basic principles of the H-bomb. He based his
research on declassified government documents. Morland was apparently close enough to “the
secret” that the U.S. government strenuously attempted to have the article suppressed.
Presumably the actual construction of an A-bomb is not difficult if the required materials can
be obtained. Mechanix Illustrated (yes, really!) reported the following in an article titled: “A
Homebuilt Atomic Bomb?”:
How do you make an A-bomb? Any number of ways. One is to take two
metal salad bowls, line them with wax, fill with plutonium and solder them together
to form a sphere. Then wrap them with plastic explosives and detonate, making sure
the exposive material goes off evenly all around the sphere. (Mechanix Illustrated,
1977: 158).
The example above may exaggerate the ease of constructing nuclear devices, but the difficulty of
nuclear “stunts” may also be overrated. Craig and Jungerman (1986: 381) conclude that:
A team of skilled terrorists could probably produce a low-yield weapon.
Nuclear weapons are small, and a terrorist organization could probably place one in
any major city, with little danger of being caught.
The reality of nuclear stunts is at hand. They appear for the moment limited to local rather than
global productions. They may still be relatively difficult but we know now that they are not
impossible.
III. C. Astounding Complexes
The previous examples lead to a third bridge explanation explicated by Goffman. At issue
here are those few times when something really does seem impossible, when we encounter
something that we just cannot account for reasonably in terms of natural law, guided doings,
muffings, or stunts. Goffman calls a situation of this character an “astounding complex.” In practice,
Goffman (1974: 28) notes, we approach an astounding complex with a sort of intellectual holding
action. That is, we “expect that a ‘simple’ or ‘natural’ explanation will soon be discovered.”
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Goffman (1974: 30) argues, and it is a central point in his analysis, that:
In our society, the very significant assumption is generally made that all
events — without exception — can be contained and managed within the
conventional system of belief. We tolerate the unexplained but not the inexplicable.
When no explanation is at hand, when we encounter an astounding complex, we rest comfortably
and confidently that explanations in terms of the two primary frameworks, natural laws and/or
guided doings, will soon arrive.
When the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, many Japanese reacted to this event
as an “astounding complex.” The destruction of Hiroshima was too great and too quick to be
accounted for by the officials of the Japanese Government in terms of their knowledge of the
military capabilities of the United States. Indeed, a temporary problem faced by the U.S.
Government after the first atomic bombing was to convince the Japanese Government that the
devastation was neither fluke nor accident.
A central function of the news media in our era is to supply explanations — when available
— and to assure us that “the details” will follow on the 11:00 p.m. news when no explanations are
immediately at hand. For example, following the destruction of Hiroshima:
The [U.S.] Office of War Information began telling the Japanese today what
hit them. OWI branch transmitters in San Francisco, Hawaii and Saipan beamed
President Truman’s statement on the atomic bomb to Japan. (New York Times,
8-7-45: 1).
The U.S. Government wanted no doubt about its part in the bombing. It wanted the Japanese
Government to understand clearly that the bombing was a devastating “guided doing” that could be
repeated many times over.
III. D. Fortuitousness
Unexplained events can also be accounted for in our culture as “fortuitous,” as when a
competently performing person:
. . . meets with the natural workings of the world in a way he could not be
expected to anticipate, with consequential results. Or two or more unconnected and
mutually unoriented individuals, each properly guiding his own doings, jointly bring
about an unanticipated event that is significant. (Goffman, 1974: 33).
Thus, as a simple matter of fortuitousness, many citizens of Hiroshima found themselves “out of
town” on business or other errands on August 6, 1945, while Japanese from other cities made trips
to the doomed city with no thought to what the day would bring. The classic French film, Hiroshima
— Mon amour, invokes precisely this appeal to fortuitous timing in a conversation between two
lovers, one of whom lived in Hiroshima and recounts how he escaped the bombing just by “luck.”
Survivors’ accounts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki tell of persons who walked away from infernos
and collapsing buildings without a scratch while friends standing next to them were instantly
incinerated. We explain such events as happenstance, fortuitous, “as luck would have it,” but — and
this is the important part — without recourse to any forces or powers beyond natural law and/or
guided doings.
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III. E. Summary
Goffman asserts that our epistemological schema is fundamentally simple and
comprehensive. All events, even the most diabolically lethal, are “made sense of” or accounted for
in terms of natural laws and/or guided doings — these are the two primary frameworks. Any events
that strain our ability to apply these two frameworks in a direct and unvarnished fashion are easily
and quickly accounted for by one of the available bridging explanations which hold our everyday
epistemological world together. These include: muffings, stunts, astounding complexes, and
fortuitousness.
I trust that the foregoing discussion and examples have made it clear that Goffman’s
microfoundational categories are not merely hypothetical. That is, where destructive nuclear devices
are concerned, these categories — these ways of making sense — are used in our culture. It is
important — and sobering — to recognize that nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare have not been
accorded extra-epistemological status outside Goffman’s two primary frameworks. That is to say,
we “make sense of” nuclear warfare in our culture in the very same way that we make sense of
everything we encounter in everyday life, from cornflakes to circus clowns to murder and mischief.
Nuclear warfare and the threat of nuclear annihilation, despite the unprecedented, industrialized
capacity for instantaneous mass violence (Giddens, 1985), do not receive special conceptual
treatment in our culture. I submit that this micro-level, business-as-usual approach to nuclear
annihilation is a serious, macro-level socio-cultural threat.
PART IV: KEYS
Before I leave the above hypothesis in final form, however, there is more to glean from
Goffman. Insights derived from his work underscore the extreme lengths which we have already
traveled in this culture to incorporate nuclear war within the bounds of our epistemological
frameworks. The elasticity of our frameworks is amazing and impressive — and in the past this has
served us well by giving rise to a nearly inexhaustible stream of transformation and invention. Yet,
is it possible that we are reaching our cultural limit? Have we socially constructed a situation in
which it no longer makes sense to stretch our conceptual categories to cover a phenomenon which
in the final analysis will blow us — and our categories — to oblivion? Before we engage an answer,
however, let me review the basic ways in which we transform events of one kind into events of
another kind. To conduct this inventory efficiently, I invoke the Goffmanian concept of “keys.”
According to Goffman, keys are identifiable sets of conventions or rules by which an activity
already “made sense of” in terms of the two primary frameworks is transformed into something
patterned on this activity but that is clearly understood by all concerned to be something quite
different. For example, suppose we observe an atmospheric or above ground detonation of a nuclear
weapon. We interpret this event initially in terms of guided doings and the laws of physics. Now,
however, suppose we watch an episode of the television show Battlestar Gallactica in which large,
global arsenals of nuclear weapons are detonated. Indeed, just such a display was offered as
entertainment during a recent re-run of the Gallactica episodes. The make-believe images on the
television screen are a “key” on actual nuclear detonations. The images on Battlestar Gallactica
were been produced according to a set of “special-effects” conventions, conventions we accept as
television viewers. In the same way, we discriminate between a “real” fight and persons who are
only “playing” at fighting. Play is a key, a set of rules, by which any serious activity can be
transformed into something less serious, perhaps even funny.
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Goffman identifies several keys or transformations common to our culture. The general
categories of keys include: make believe, contests, ceremonies, and technical redoings. Not all
transformations are straightforward keys, however. “Fabrications” are additional transformations
in which persons are deliberately deceived about the actual seriousness of events in which they are
engaged. Much government propaganda falls into the category of “fabrication.” Deception is
fundamentally involved in attempts to establish verification rules by which one nuclear power can
monitor the nuclear capabilities of another without being duped as to the real state of affairs.
Important as these issues are, they are delayed here for treatment in a subsequent analysis. The
relevant point here is that anything that can be keyed can also be faked, and vice versa, apparently
ad infinitum. The following review focuses specifically on keys alone and illustrates that we have,
in our everyday world, performed every major key upon the serious reality of nuclear destruction.
Keep in mind what this implies. It means that we have taken the reality and global horror of nuclear
death and — through the use of keys — transformed it into many other things which are not lethal
and which may even be thought of as “fun” or entertainment.
My intent here is not to be exhaustive within each category or subcategory of any specific
key, but I do intend to be comprehensive in showing that each of the keys Goffman identifies (as
well as some he does not) are used in our culture to transform the reality of nuclear weapons into
something different, often something less than real, something fictional, even playful. The major
possibilities, with examples, are outlined below.
IV. A. Make-Believe
By the term “make-believe,” Goffman (1974: 48) refers to the immitation or running through
of the activity that is keyed “with the knowledge that nothing practical will come of the doing.”
Specific subcategories include the following:
IV. A. 1. Play and Playfulness
By “play,” Goffman (1974: 48) refers to “relatively brief intrusions of unserious mimicry.”
In the following example of atomic play, however, things did get a bit out of hand:
Four children were injured yesterday afternoon when chemicals with which
they were playing at making atom bombs exploded [in a Brooklyn apartment]. (New
York Times, 12-3-45: 12).
IV. A. 2. Daydreams and Private Fantasy
The extent to which members of our society daydream about nuclear war and/or nuclear
weapons is unknown, but psychologists remind us that a significant number of youngsters do at least
“think about” the possibility of nuclear war. From my own experience as a nuclear weapons guard
in the U.S. Air Force, I can relate that I found myself more than once constructing mental “What if
.....?” scenarios involving an atomic missile launch. We know that many people while asleep have
dreams and nightmares about nuclear attacks, but these are not discussed here since Goffman
analyzes dreams as fabrications rather than keys.
The cerebral musings that philosophers and other thinkers leave to us in memoirs and diarys
can be conceptualized as the written aftermath of daydreams and private fantasy. Consider the
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following entry in the diary left by Thomas Merton (1965: 249) and recorded at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis:
I am only just beginning to realize that we were very close indeed to nuclear
war; never so close! The very undignified way Kruschev backed down makes this
very clear indeed. The bombers were all ready to go, and he had no doubts on that
score. Thank God it is over.
Thus, Merton provided a written trace of his private, presumably unscripted thoughts.
IV. A. 3. Dramatic Scriptings
The example above, in its written form, introduces scripts intended to unfold publicly as a
story. Goffman (1974: 53) included here the wide range of productions offered “to the public
through the media of television, radio, newspapers, magazines, books, theater.” He viewed dramatic
scriptings as especially significant because:
. . . they provide a mock-up of everyday life, a put together script of
unscripted social doings, and thus are a source of broad hints concerning the
structure of [unscripted guided doings]. (Goffman, 1974: 53).
Specific sub-categories noted by Goffman include the following (to which I have added a few
additional conventional formulas not treated by Goffman, including: television dramas, poems,
popular music, proper names, slogans, and jokes):
IV. A. 3. a. Novels
Novels are a paradigm example of scripted nuclear keyings to the extent that they are
imaginary stories based on the actuality of potential nuclear destruction. Examples include:
(1) Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler’s classic, Fail Safe.
(2) N.J. Crisp’s recent thriller, The Brink.
(3) Peter George’s Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.
(4) Jeff Sutton’s H-Bomb over America. This book is described on its book jacket as “a
novel of the five most harrowing days and nights ever faced by any nation.”
(5) John Gardner’s The Last Trump. From the book jacket, we learn that this is a book about
“The free world’s last chance: Golgotha — a top secret missile installation that can
only be activated with bits of information stored in the subconscious minds of sleeper
agents.” Such is the stuff of James Bond!
IV. A. 3. b. Television Dramas
Recent offerings on television that key nuclear detonation tend toward the sober side rather
than the Ramboid adventurism of the above listed novels. Examples include:
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(1) Home, a PBS production, explores the moral dilemma faced by two Air Force officers
at an underground launch control facility who receive an order to launch their
minuteman missiles at targets in the USSR. It turns out that the launch order is an
error, and the officer who resists the launch becomes thereby a hero.
(2) The Day After, a commercial venture, was very successful in U.S. television ratings, a
point noted with pride in the trade journal Advertising Age.
(3) Threads, a production of the BBC, is also a drama in the realist genre.
(4) With an attempt at humor, the 1986-87 season run of Sledge Hammer ended when the
gung-ho police detective “muffs” his attempt to disarm a nuclear warhead, causing
an atomic holocaust.
IV. A. 3. c. Legitimate Theater
Numerous stage plays key nuclear themes. Examples include:
(1) But with a Whimper, by Pat Revor, concerns an English couple who survive a nuclear
holocaust and speculate on how it occured while they try to maintain hope.
(2) Meet Noah Smith, by G.L. Bennett, adapts the biblical story of Noah to modern times
where nuclear fallout contaminates the earth and a bomb shelter replaces the ark.
(3) Ground Zero, by Brian Shein, is a satire on nuclear war.
Many additional stage plays are found easily by consulting the Play Index under the “subject
heading” (yet another key!) of “Nuclear war.”
IV. A. 3. d. Motion Pictures
The list here is substantial. Two filmographies cataloging the available nuclear movies were
already compiled a decade ago (Dowling, 1977; Shaheen, 1978). Classic film examples include:
(1) The Mouse That Roared, in which the Grand Duchy of Fenwick declares war on the
United States so Fenwick can lose and thereby collect foreign aid from the U.S.
Through happenstance, however, Fenwick steals a U.S. doomsday bomb capable of
destroying the entire planet and thus wins its war by holding the nuclear nations
“hostage.”
(2) Dr. Strangelove, in which an Air Force Officer utilizes his knowledge of SIOP plans to
purposely launch a nuclear attack on the USSR.
(3) Hiroshima — Mon amour, in which a Japanese man who survived the bombing of
Hiroshima as a matter of fortuitousness falls in love with a French woman who, in
her own way, survived the ravages of World War II in Europe and has come to Japan
as an actress to make a peace film about Hiroshima.
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(4) War Games, in which a teenage hacker penetrates the Pentagon’s most sophisticated
computer network and almost starts a global nuclear exchange “by accident.”
IV. A. 3. e. Poetry
Poets have turned their pens to virtually everything, including nuclear destruction. Several
examples are found in The Oxford Book of War Poetry; Of Quarks, Quasars, and other Quirks —
Quizzical Poems for the Supersonic Age; Breaking Silence — An Anthology of Contemporary Asian
American Poets; and other available anthologies. Specific poems are easily located by consulting
Granger’s Index to poetry under the subject headings “atomic” and “nuclear.” I produce here the
entire text of a poem from the Oxford Book of 20th Century English Verse (pp. 585-86) that keys
a nuclear attack:
Your Attention Please
by Peter Porter
The Polar DEW has just warned that
A nuclear rocket strike of
At least one thousand megatons
Has been launched by the enemy
Directly at our major cities.
This announcement will take
Two and a quarter minutes to make,
You therefore have a further
Eight and a quarter minutes
To comply with the shelter
Requirements published in the Civil
Defence Code—section Atomic Attack.
A specially shortened Mass
Will be broadcast at the end
Of this announcement—
Protestant and Jewish services
Will begin simultaneously—
Select your wavelength immediately
According to instructions
In the Defence Code. Do not
Take well-loved pets (including birds)
Into your shelter—they will consume
Fresh air. Leave the old and bedridden, you can do nothing for them.
Remember to press the sealing
Switch when everyone is in
The shelter. Set the radiation
Aerial, turn on the geiger barometer.
Turn off your Television now.
Turn off your radio immediately
The Services end. At the same time
Secure explosion plugs in the ears
Of each member of your family. Take
Down your plasma flasks. Give your children
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The pills marked one and two
In the C.D. green container, then put
Them to bed. Do not break
The inside airlock seals until
The radiation All Clear shows
(Watch for the cuckoo in your
perspex panel), or your District
Touring Doctor rings your bell.
If before this, your air becomes
Exhausted or if any of your family
Is critically injured, administer
The capsules marked ‘Valley Forge’
(Red pocket in No. I Survival Kit)
For painless death. (Catholics
Will have been instructed by their priests
What to do in this eventuality.)
This announcement is ending. Our President
Has already given orders for
Massive retaliation—it will be
Decisive. Some of us may die.
Remember, statistically
It is not likely to be you.
All flags are flying fully dressed
On Government buildings—the sun is shining.
Death is the least we have to fear.
We are all in the hands of God,
Whatever happens happens by His Will.
Now go quickly to your shelters.
IV. A. 3. f. Popular Music
An interesting point about keys and keying on the eve of destruction is that no key gets a
monopoly on nuclear devastation. The serious poet and playwright are not unique in their gloom or
their satire. For example, Peter Tosh’s new recording, No Nuclear War, was deemed “best reggae
album” among the 1988 awards of the recording industry. The lyrics from two popular, mass market
music albums are included here to illustrate the practice of keying nuclear annihilation in all
quarters. The first lyrics key the potential for propaganda in a nuclear era while the second set is the
epitome of understatement, suggesting that after a nuclear attack “it’s never gonna be the same.”
Man at C & A
by The Specials
Warnin’ warnin’ nuclear attack
Atomic sources designed to blow your mind
World War III
Nuclear nuclear attack
Rocking atomically in this third world war
Atomic sounds
The man in black he told me the lastest Moscow news
about the storm across the Red Sea
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They drove their ballpoint views
I’m the man in grey, I’m just the man at C & A
And I don’t have a say in the wargames that they play
Warnin’ warnin’ nuclear attack
Shock attack to hit you in the back
World War III
The Mickey Mouse bunch told the Ayatollah at his feet
You’ll drink your oil you schmuck, we’ll eat our heads of wheat
But I’m the man in grey, I’m just the man at C & A
And I don’t have a say in the wargames that they play
Don’t chuck another bomb
Nuclear nuclear nuclear war
Warnin’ warnin’ nuclear attack
The bomb will never fall
Shock attack.
Rendez-Vous with Radiation
by Rob Bolland
Bombs exploding, silver shadows in the night
Plans unfolding, telling me we’re gonna die
Vision’s fading, buring fires in the night
Should have stayed in, it’s not safe to be outside
Rendez-vous with radiation
Rendez-vous with radiation
I know that it’s never gonna be the same
Watch the fallout, got to save ourselves somehow
Soldiers call out, nothing here can save us now
Rendez-vous with radiation
Rendez-vous with radiation
I now that it’s never gonna be the same.
IV. A. 3. g. Names
The nuclear era brings opportunities to key the A-bomb in terms of one’s commercial
business operations. That this should happen in a capitalist society is perhaps not unexpected.
Consider the following white pages business listings in the Chicago telephone directory:
ATOMIC AUTO RECYCLING INC
ATOMIC DRAINAGE SERVICE
ATOMIC ELECTRONICS
ATOMIC ENGINEERING CO
ATOMIC SUBMARINE
ATOMIC TELEVISION SERVICE
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IV. A. 3. h. Slogans
Ban the Bomb!
No Nukes!
IV. A. 3. i. Jokes and Cartoons
“If You’ve Seen One Nuclear War You’ve Seen them All!”
The attached cartoons (Figures 1 and 2, below) attest that we are never above a bit of mirth,
even when what is being keyed is grave, grim, and final.
IV. B. Contests
Can we have nuclear games, complete with rules for winning and losing? Of course. One can
purchase a board game titled Nuclear War.2 This transformation includes the built-in assumption
that someone, presumably “our side,” can “win.”
IV. C. Ceremonials
Nuclear ceremonies take various forms. When we take time to look, we see ritual dramas
of many types unexpectedly embedded in and structuring our everyday lives (Deegan, forthcoming).
The thrice daily loading of SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plans plans on board SAC’s
continuously airborne secondary command posts has distinctive ritual traits grounded in centuries
of military pomp and circumstance.3 Other ceremonies are commemorative. Recently, those
involved in the design of the first atomic bomb arranged an official reunion, complete with all the
ritual reminiscing that typifies reunions. The New York Times reported:
Los Alamos, N.M. After 40 years, the memories of the men and women
meeting here this weekend went back to little things. . . . A buildings manager
remembered the impatience of a famous nuclear scientist whose quarters were too
cold. It turned out that Edward Teller did not know how to turn up the thermostat.
(New York Times, 6-17-85: 12).

2
3

Seen for sale in the window of a hobby shop in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Regularly witnessed during my tour of duty in the Strategic Air Command at Offutt Air
Force Base.
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Formal religious services were recently performed on the exact site of the first atomic
explosion (the “Trinity Test”) complete with an alter steeped in nuclear symbolism:
Rev. Layton Zimmer of St. Adrian’s Episcopal Church in Albuquerque . . .
celebrated the Eucharist at an alter bearing earth from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (New
York Times, 7-17-85: 14).
A particularly somber series of ceremonies are the annual reunions, peace marches, and
vigils of the Hibakusha, or “survivors,” of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These ceremonial marches and
demonstrations were documented recently in a PBS special titled: Remembering the Bomb.
Specifically artistic celebration is also possible. A recent article in Print titled “Celebrating Survival”
tells how:
The 40th anniversary of the atomic disaster at Hiroshima is commemorated
by 125 U.S. designers and illustrators, Joining with their Japanese colleagues to
create posters as a gift to the city [of Hiroshima].
IV. D. Technical Redoings
Technical redoings involve performing an activity out of its usual context with the
understanding that the original outcome of the activity will not occur, yet unlike play the redoing
is for a utilitarian purpose. Sub-categories include the following:
IV. D. 1. Practicing
IV. D. 1. a. Simulations
Since the atmospheric test ban, all United States nuclear tests have been
carried out underground at a test site in Nevada . . . . But underground tests are of
limited utility in gauging the actual effects of nuclear weapons on housing and
military facilities, so simulated tests are carried out from time to time using chemical
explosives. (New York Times, 6-28-1985: 10).
IV. D. 1. b. Rehearsals
began:

Consider this news story on practice runs flown by B-52 bombers in the U.S. The account
To train for a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, the B-52 bomber
thundered down the icy runway and lifted off over the North Dakota prairie just as
dawn broke. (New York Times, 12-2-55,II: 11).

A central feature of nuclear wargames is that these practice runs can mimic but never achieve “real”
conditions. As Goffman (1974: 65) put it:
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This dilemma is seen most clearly perhaps in war games, where participants
must take seriously that which can ultimately be made serious only by what can’t be
employed: “live” ammunition lethally directed.
IV. D. 1. c. Planning
Attentive readers of newspapers need few reminders that the U.S. Department of Defense
is continually reviewing and revising its plans for future nuclear devastation. Budget approval for
ever more sophisticated deployment and delivery systems, if temporarily slowed from time to time,
has become routine. Recent history clearly documents the planning and acquisition of the
B1-bomber, MIRVs, Long-wave radio transmitters, the neutron bomb, and now, the so-called
Strategic Defense Initiative (whose lasers, paradoxically, are powered by H-bomb detonations).
IV. D. 2. Demonstrations
Demonstrations or tests of actual nuclear devices have a long and continuing history. A
nuclear test is a redoing because although a real nuclear weapon is detonated, it is not intended to
have lethal consequences. The fallout from atmospheric tests does have long-range health
implications even if the test site per se has been fully evacuated. Thus, such tests have been
suspended by nuclear powers. Hence, the use of chemical simulations of above ground tests and the
present use of below ground tests which are assumed not to have the potentially lethal consequences
of above ground tests.
IV. D. 3. Replays
Recent developments in photographic and electronic technology have vastly increased our
capacity to document and then review our actions on film and video.
IV. D. 3. a. Documentation
The documentary format includes news reports, microfilm, histories, photo essays,
illustrations, news film archives, interviews, documentary films, and so on. Several PBS
documentaries during the past few years have focused on the development of nuclear devices, their
testing, use, and present deployment.
I recently received a catalog of “Documentary Photo Aids” to use in classroom teaching. For
the price of $42.00, one can obtain a set of 40 “photo aids” that depict “The First Nuclear War.” The
text in the catalog states that:
The pictures take you into Hiroshima and Nagasaki minutes after the atomic
explosions to show the appalling devastation. The set asks difficult questions about
our rationale for being the first to use the atomic bomb.
A companion set of 18 photos, titled “Development of the Atomic Bomb,” is available for $17.00.
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IV. D. 3. b. Exhibits
Museums in Japan and the United States enshrine the history of the nuclear age. The U.S.
National Atomic Museum is located at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. Facilities include:
Library of books on the history of nuclear weapons available on premises;
devices, models and actual weapons explaining atomic structure and the use of
nuclear energy in war and peace. (Source: American Museum Directory).
Bring the kids, no charge!
IV. D. 4. Group Psychotherapy and Role-Playing
I didn’t really expect to find a solid example of psycho- nuclear role play, but a recent book
by William and Mary Van Ornum titled Talking to Children About Nuclear War rounds out this
collection of Goffmanian keys. Here is just one of many “sample dialogs” for parents to study. The
reader is asked, “What do you think will be the result of the following conversations?”
Dialog C. It’s 9:30 p.m., and the fire siren in a small Midwestern town goes
off. Josh, who is six years old, looks at his mother worriedly. Josh: Mom, do you
think that could be the Bomb? Mother: It sounds like the fire siren honey. It’s a scary
thought, isn’t it? It seems a lot of people have been thinking about that lately. It’s
always in the news. What do you know about it honey? Do your friends talk about
it? Are you worried?
IV. D. 5. Experiments
Experiments are structurally similar to demonstrations and tests, although there is the
presumption that something new will be learned in an experiment whereas nuclear tests and
demonstrations may be partially or wholly motivated as a “show of force” rather than a scientific
inquiry. If people are duped into being subjects of an experiment without their informed consent,
Goffman speaks of their being contained in a category of fabrication, but full analysis of this
category lies beyond the scope of this paper (for discussion of the social meaning of fabrications and
lies, see Goffman, 1974: 83-122, 156-200, 378-495; and Bok, 1978). Early nuclear detonations were
dressed in experimental garb because the specific effects of nuclear blasts were unknown. Nuclear
experiments continue to dominate the news since underground detonations of H-bombs are
considered essential by the U.S. Government for developing the lasers required for the proposed
Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) missile defense system.
PART V: CONCLUSION
This nuclear-based tour of Goffmanian keys has a purpose: to remind ourselves of the
extreme flexibility and transformations permitted by our microfoundational rules for organizing our
everyday lives. They allow us in our everyday lives to key at will, to make jokes, movies, novels,
experiments, slogans, museum displays, and so on and on, based upon keying the most deadly peril
our world has ever faced. This flexibility is itself a threat. We ought to be wary when we key or
transform nuclear warfare in the same way that we key other socially important but far less serious
events such as, for example, AIDS and teenage suicide (both of which have their full complement
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of jokes, songs, poetry, television dramas, talk show discussions, fund raisers, and self-help groups).
We act on the nuclear threat in exactly the same way, writing letters to congresspersons, organizing
talk shows, fund raisers, television ads, newsletters, staging marches, demonstrations, and teach-ins.
I noted in the introduction to this paper that such activities are not without merit, but their value does
not lie primarily in their ability to end or reduce the nuclear threat. A telling comment to this point
was heard on the weekly Midwestern television talk show called “Nuclear Issues.” The hostess
interviewed the organizer of a nuclear freeze protest march. The organizer, when pressed about the
effectiveness of the proposed march, replied that even if it didn’t help end the arms race, the march
itself would be fun.
I have nothing against a good time or the generation of genuine communitas, these are
important and fully legitimate human goals. At the same time, we must be careful not to confuse
these keyed activities with serious actions actually designed to effectively terminate our present
capacity for nuclear annihilation. In the same way, those of us with intellectual commitments to end
the nuclear threat must also be very careful not to confuse our standard academic practices with the
serious, unprecedented microfoundational work now required to give our society the improved tools
it needs to come to grips with and solve our nuclear reality.
We must search for and/or invent a new microfoundational frame in which to act on our
socially-constructed nuclear world. It has not helped to think about our nuclear dilemma as a natural
science or engineering issue, a moral issue, a policy issue, or a military issue. I conclude that our
macro nuclear dilemma is rooted fundamentally in a microfoundational flaw: the comprehensive
transformational nature of all available frames. We too easily and too often mistake our frames for
reality. When we do stumble from time to time upon and recognize the sheer horror of our nuclear
situation, we diffuse it in a thousand ways through ready transformations. Transformational keys
strip what little understanding we do have of its capacity to generate effective action. Thus, we
concentrate our social energies on transformed realities rather than the main event. The question
stands before us: “Do we have the microfoundational equipment to understand and confront the
radically new world that global nuclear destruction presents to us?” The present answer is negative.
Consider the forms and formats we have already devised and used to discuss, debate, and
presumably understand the nuclear threat. We have essays, poems, novels, histories, analyses,
symposiums, debates, interviews, documentaries, expert testimony, briefings, prayers, sermons,
papal encyclicals, declarations, college courses, catalogs, inventories, surveys, censuses,
questionnaires, hearings, referendums, marches, speeches, satire, protests, sit-ins, teach-ins, letters
to editors and congresspersons, news reports, memos, committees, agencies, commissions, lobbies,
leaflets, ads, myths and parables, comic books, nightmares, glossaries, checklists, plans, exercises,
investigations, exposes and, yes, papers such as this one. To what avail is all this work by this
society’s cultural laborers?
The future consequences of ineffectual activity are horrendous in our nuclear era. The
situations we define as “helping” only serve to dissipate our intellectual resources and delay a
solution. William and Dorothy Thomas (1928: 572) were correct to observe that, “If men define
situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” And Goffman (1974: 1) was even more
perceptive in recognizing that the Thomas’ famous dictum is:
. . . true as it reads but false as it is taken. Defining situations as real certainly
has consequences, but these may contribute very marginally to the events in
progress; in some cases only a slight embarrassment flits across the scene in mild
concern for those who tried to define the situation wrongly. All the world is not a
stage . . . .
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Neither is all the world a conference, symposium, or classroom. But few of us are embarrassed that
we so often act on the opposite belief. Ineffectual activity, no matter how highly touted by its
proponents, has real consequences when the penalty for inaction is severe and final. All the while
our words flow and flower in key after key, the deployed nuclear arsenal grows ever more deadly.
We presently live in a Goffmanian, tranformationally vulnerable nuclear world. The length
of this epoch may be relatively short. This review suggests it is possible that our keys and our frames
for “making sense of” things are failing us now when we need them most. It is possible that our
microfoundational frameworks allow us to deceive ourselves at the very moment that we think
ourselves most rational and serious. Is Goffman now laughing at us as we snore away in the last
hours of the nuclear age? Our eventual wholesale extinction at the macro-level may well be rooted
in exceedingly micro-level issues. At the same time, I very much hope that my thesis — that our
microfoundational cultural apparatus appears ill-equipped, if not unable, to conceptualize or frame
the present nuclear threat in a way that lets us truly come to grips with it — is very much wrong. If
there is hope for our collective future, it requires nothing less than inventing entirely new
frameworks of meaning for the micro-level organization of everyday life, ones in which the reality
of nuclear devices and the very real threat of nuclear annihilation cannot be keyed into ineffective
frames that become comfortable and less threatening. This is no small task, one that challenges us
to think creatively beyond the apparently comprehensive microfoundational limits within which our
everyday world is now contained, constructed, and made meaningful.
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